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Rather than existing exclusively in the domestic politics of weak states, corruption in the developing world involves a 
myriad of different actors, ranging from corrupt state officials and local and international middlemen to offshore shell 
companies and reputable financial institutions. Building upon a few recent empirical studies, this article exposes the 
symbiosis of illicit practices in developing countries with licit and semi-licit practices in developed countries in order 
to explore the financial connections, which are integral to the nexus of weak states and organised criminal groups. 
Central Asia will be used as an empirical ground to showcase how a developing region gets connected to the global 
economy via hidden and informal financial vehicles and offshore enterprises. My research has strong normative 
aspirations, since the article calls for the reassessment of the global anti-corruption regime in targeting transnational 
financial crimes. The overall goal of the research is to change the conversation about corruption, state weakness and 
organised crime: rather than speaking about problems of merely local, national and regional provenance, we need to 
recognize that we are dealing here with global challenges requiring global solutions. 
Although the notion of corruption is probably as old as human civilization, the wave of global anti-corruption norms 
and strategies began only in the early 1990s as an effect of accelerated globalization processes.1 In a famous speech, 
then-president of the World Bank James Wolfensohn placed “the cancer of corruption” on the agenda of development 
organizations and international institutions.2 The fight against corruption was launched under the aegis of good 
governance and the promotion of accountability and transparency. International actors such as the IMF and the 
World Bank began to identify corruption as one of the main obstacles to economic growth in the developing world. 
The initiatives these organizations proclaimed reinvigorated interest in the topic of corruption in the academy as well, 
leading scholars to study the impact and effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. However, as Alexander Cooley 
and Jason Sharman point out, those academic conceptualizations often reproduce the idea that corruption is 
contained only within states and in the practices of their officials.3 In those instances when corruption is examined in a 
transnational context, it is usually presented as an indispensable part of criminal networks that link illicit activities 
with officials of weak states and illicit non-state actors, including organized crime factions, terrorists, weapons 
traffickers, drug smugglers and money launderers.4 
However, by focusing on illicit globalization, scholars and 
policymakers often omit the role of licit actors and financial 
mechanisms in the developed world that facilitate the 
expansion of illicit and corrupt practices in developing states. 
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such scholarly contemplations and policy-making recommendations. Central Asia is endowed with vast natural 
resources and conducive to lucrative business opportunities. The region, however, is characterized by authoritarian or 
semi-authoritarian rule with clan or family based decision-making. As a result, only the most privileged tend to benefit 
from the current state of affairs, amassing fortunes at the expense of ordinary people. At the same time, the unlawful 
enrichment of Central Asian rulers and their entourages could not have been accomplished without the support of 
local and international brokers, offshore companies and major financial institutions, which operate within the realm of 
licit and formal norms and practices. Respectively, corruption in the 
developing states and in Central Asia per se should be examined within 
a transnational context. The fusion of the formal global economy with 
local informal economies poses a serious regulatory challenge to both 
scholars and policymakers who seek to establish sustaining policies and 
greater oversight over these spheres in accordance with practices of 
good governance, transparency and accountability. 
Indeed, Central Asia is an excellent empirical referent to examine the dynamics of transnational corruption. 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan provide numerous illuminating cases, which 
demonstrate how hypothetically isolated Central Asia becomes connected to the global economy via contemporary 
financial mechanisms. The cases are extremely diverse and range from telecommunications and fuel procurement to 
gold mining and banking. In the post-Soviet republic of Kyrgyzstan, I have conducted research on the complex 
interplay between different actors over access to fuel supplies at the American air base Manas. Both Presidents 
Akayev and Bakiyev and their entourages exploited the Pentagon’s lucrative fuel contracts for personal enrichment 
and to strengthen their regimes. The intricate fuel schemes involved not only Kyrgyz senior officials and shell and 
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intermediary companies, but also the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Gazprom refineries. The capture 
of fuel supplies to the Manas Air Base was accomplished through the use of local subcontractors and fixed-based 
operators. As it turned out, the DoD knew about the beneficiaries of the Kyrgyz fuel subcontractors. However, the 
Pentagon’s position was that any misappropriation of funds by the Kyrgyz leadership was solely the responsibility of 
the country’s internal affairs and thus respectively at the discretion of the Kyrgyz judicial system, as long as the fuel 
procurements were conducted in accordance with American laws and regulations.5 In turn, U.S. contracting and 
procurement laws permitted companies affiliated with foreign leaders and their entourages to bid and win DoD 
tenders.6 As a result, rumours and circumstantial evidence that American vendors were enriching both the Akayev 
and Bakiyev regimes were instrumental in the fall of these governments in 2005 and 2010 and led to several resonant 
national and international investigations.  
The watchdog Global Witness conducted its own investigation in Kyrgyzstan, but in this case related to its largest 
bank Asia Universal Bank (AUB). AUB was nationalized after the April events of 2010 and was accused of 
involvement in large-scale money laundering by the new government, while an independent EBRD-funded audit 
supported this view. Global Witness found significant evidence of money laundering through AUB, as dozens of 
onshore and offshore companies moved millions of dollars through the bank with no clear business activity.7 Nearly 
1.2 billion USD passed through the AUB accounts of just three UK companies, which then dissolved without filing 
any account information.8 The largest transfers went through the UK’s Standard Chartered, Austrian Raiffeisen 
Bank and Citibank in New York.9 In the most flagrant example, a UK 
company, which moved 700 million USD through its AUB account 
without any business activity in the UK, was owned by a Russian who 
died two years before the company was actually registered.10 Such 
reports reveal the stark inadequacy of how some of the world’s major 
economies monitor the registration of companies and contribute to 
global money-laundering. 
In Kazakhstan, the Texas oil company Baker Hughes became the focus 
of one of the most resonant corruption scandals. To win a 219 million 
USD oil contract in Karachaganak, Baker Hughes made payments to 
Kazakh officials via British tycoon Robert Kissin, using a Barclays bank 
account set up on behalf of a shell company registered in the Isle of 
Man.11 The Swedish-Finnish telecommunications company 
TeliaSonera was targeted in probes for aggravated bribery in 
Uzbekistan, and its CEO Lars Nyberg had to step down under increased public scrutiny. Allegedly 300 million USD 
was paid by TeliaSonera to an associate of Gulnara Karimova, the daughter of the president of Uzbekistan, through 
the CEO of a competing Russian telecommunication company MTS and a Gibraltar-registered shell company in 
order to gain access to the national telecom market.12 On March 24, 2010, German carmaker Daimler agreed to pay 
185 million USD to settle international bribery charges leveled by American prosecutors in at least 22 countries, 
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including Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.13 In certain cases, Daimler made improper payments to American bank 
accounts or to foreign bank accounts of US shell firms.14 In Turkmenistan, Daimler was accused of handing a new 
armoured S-class Mercedes worth of !300,000 to a high level official as a birthday present to ensure that Daimler’s 
sales were not jeopardized in the country.15 In the UK, a dispute over the Tajikistan Aluminium Company (Talco) 
became one of the most expensive legal proceedings ever held at the London High Court. The lawsuit involved the 
offshore holding company Ansol registered in the Guernsey Islands on one side and United Company Rusal and two 
companies registered in the British Virgin Islands on the other side.16 
The aforementioned cases confirm that corruption in the developing world involves not only local state officials but 
also international middlemen, offshore shell companies, multinational companies and reputable financial institutions. 
This constellation demonstrates that political power is not contained solely within national units, but flows from the 
transnational through to the national and the local. In most of the examples above, the companies, which were 
involved in corrupt activities, were prosecuted. Unfortunately, these cases are just the tip of the iceberg as many more 
companies engage in illicit practices without being exposed. Such corrupt practices are not only a predominant 
feature of business relations in the post-Soviet region but in other regions as well. The global assemblages of different 
players only conform to the proposed dynamics of transnational corruption, which takes place with the complicity of 
reputable international institutions or even with their direct engagement. By assessing the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of the global anti-corruption regime, I hope to uncover the mechanisms through which relatively weak 
states with strong organized criminal groups gain access to licit sources of transnational finance. Such a study would 
call for a global approach to tackling issues of transnational corruption on the post-Soviet space.  
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